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Pension Reform and the




Poznań University of Technology
Tomasz Brzęczek
Poznań University of Technology
 Poland belongs to a relatively small group of European countries 
that, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, introduced comprehensive, 
structural reforms, changing the whole structure of their pension sys-
tems. Earlier structural pension reforms had been introduced in Sweden 
(1998) and Hungary (1998). In Poland, this took place in 1999, and it 
was followed by Bulgaria (2000), Latvia (2001), Croatia (2002), and 
Estonia (2002). Recommendations contained in a World Bank report 
(1994) have had a signifi cant impact on the shape of structural pen-
sion reforms. A representative of the World Bank in Poland was even 
directly involved in introducing the pension reform. The basic element 
of structural pension reform was the introduction of a capital-fi nanced 
segment into social security systems (privately managed individual ac-
counts), which in effect meant the partial privatization of the pension 
system (Żukowski 2006). 
Despite the similarities between these structural reforms, there were 
also signifi cant differences. One of them was the underdevelopment of 
the third-pillar, employer-provided supplementary pension systems in 
all the reformed pension systems of the postsocialist countries. In this 
respect they differ, for example, from the Swedish model. In Sweden, 
occupational pension plans play an important role in securing the fi -
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nances of future retirees, covering the majority of employees due to 
widespread collective bargaining agreements.
In 2011, Poland made a partial reversal from the original reform 
that involved the diversifi cation of risk between the PAYG and the fully 
funded segments. Funded second-pillar pension plans are mandatory in 
Poland, following the original reform, and cover nearly the entire labor 
force. Since June 2011, the mandatory second-pillar pension funds—
the individual account pension funds, managed by private fi nancial 
institutions—have been funded with contributions of only 2.3 percent 
of wages. Previously, the fully funded segment had received contribu-
tions of 7.3 percent. In 2013, the 2.3 percent was raised to 2.8 percent. 
The total mandatory pension contributions is 19.55 percent of pension 
of wages, which was not changed. The difference between 2.3 or 2.8 
percent and 7.3 percent is transferred to the Polish Social Security fund 
(ZUS), which provides social security benefi ts through a notional de-
fi ned contribution plan.
While the reform of the public pension system in Poland since 1999 
has been the subject of many studies in Poland and abroad (see Góra 
[2009] and Góra and Palmer [2004]), the operation of supplementary 
pension systems, and especially the still underdeveloped voluntary 
employer-provided occupational pension system, has not received such 
interest, with a few exceptions (see Szczepański [2011]). Only a few 
researchers have tried to explain why the potential hidden within the 
occupational pension plans has not been utilized in Poland. 
With these plans, benefi ts cannot be taken before retirement age. 
Contributions are made on an after-tax basis. The plan must be offered 
to more than 50 percent of the employees of the company. The em-
ployer is required to contribute to the plan, with a maximum employer 
contribution of 7 percent of the employee’s wages. Employees can 
voluntarily contribute. Voluntary employer-provided pensions cover 
only a small percentage of the labor force. This chapter attempts to 
explain why. It focuses on the conceptual and empirical identifi cation 
of different types of risk involved in employer-provided individual ac-
count (defi ned contribution) pension plans. It examines the state of risk 
awareness on behalf of the employer-sponsors related to the investment 
of funds accumulated in occupational pension plans. It compares the 
investment performance of Employees’ Pension Funds investment with 
the results of other types of investment funds operating on the Polish 
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fi nancial market, and uses risk as an explanation for why most of Polish 
employers have not adopted pension plans for their employees. 
RISK CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONAL
PENSION PLANS
The economic literature defi nes risk, for which there are many 
types, as an event with the possibility of different results achieved 
with a certain probability. Risk is most broadly classifi ed depending 
on the outcome of an event (Fabozzi and Modigliani 2009, pp. 23–31; 
Monkiewicz and Gąsiorkiewicz 2010, p. 35): pure risk refers to situa-
tions in which a random event occurs and results in loss or no loss, and 
speculative risk exists when the result of an event is a loss or gain in 
relation to initially assumed expected outcome.
Operation of occupational pension plans is subject to risk of 
bankruptcy, break of contract, or an event insured within Employees’ 
Pension-Insurance Fund (such as occupational disease or accident). 
Such funds operate in many countries (such as the United States and 
Germany), but not in Poland. More speculative risk factors of occupa-
tional pension plans include, for example, the risk of political and legal 
regulations, investment risk, and fi nancial or business risk.
The classifi cation of risk factors into systematic and specifi c ones 
remains important from the point of view of risk management (Fabozzi 
and Drake 2009, pp. 555–574; Monkiewicz and Gąsiorkiewicz 2010, 
p. 36). Systematic risk concerns events a company cannot alter because 
they result from the macro environment. In the case of an occupational 
pension plan, these factors include
• demographic risk, especially the longevity of employees in a 
company pension plan;
• political risk due to legal regulations and their frequent changes 
to which pension institutions have to adapt;
• interest rate risk affects investment performance;
• currency risk, which affects the results of foreign investments 
and revenues of an enterprise importing or exporting goods; 
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• risk of market valuation of asset class and the associated eco-
nomic risks; 
• risk of purchasing power due to the uncertain future rate of 
infl ation;
• risk related to market liquidity of assets; and
• risk related to market conditions for reinvestment (market re-
investment risk).
Table 8.1 summarizes the systematic (macroeconomic) and specifi c 
(microeconomic) business risks of occupational pension plans accord-
ing to their operational and fi nancial-investment activity.
Specifi c risk concerns a single occupational pension plan and is 
thus called micro risk here. The following factors of this risk have been 
distinguished:
• Business risk, including market-demand risk of business activ-
ity of an enterprise with a pension system and an entity that 
manages it.
• Management risk, which is conditioned by an improper man-
agement of an enterprise and its pension system and capital. 
This risk can be limited by public supervision of pension 
institutions.
• Breach of contract risk—the source of its origin is the failure 
to meet conditions agreed between the parties to the transaction 
and written in the contract.
• Risk of insurance event regarding participants in the occupa-
tional pension plan in the form of life insurance.
• Liquidity of assets risk results from the investment strategy, 
just as other factors.
• Risk of the investment preferences of participants regards an 
approved return rate and its term structure tailored to the age 
of the insured.
• Risk of a fi nancial instrument valuation is a problem with 
risky investment effi ciency in terms of the ratio of expected 
return and its volatility measured with, for example, standard 
deviation. 
Pension Reform and the Measurement of Risk   167
• Market reinvestment risk due to assets durability and time ho-
rizon of portfolio of given fund. 
• Financial risk associated with interest and repayment of bor-
rowed foreign capital and its liabilities, which in the case of 
occupational pension plans relates to pension disbursement.
• Risk of bankruptcy. It may result in a company’s bankruptcy 
caused by two previously described types of risk, the risk of 
contract breach and the fi nancial risk. 
A SURVEY ASSESSING OCCUPATIONAL PENSION PLAN 
RISK IN POLAND
The risk of occupational pension plans is a complex concept, which 
consists of all the previously mentioned factors. Occupational pension 
plans in Poland have operated since 1999, which is a relatively short 
time period (the tradition of employer sponsored plans, which is longer 
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than that of social security, reaches the era of industrial revolution). 
Most of the employers do not have enough experience with investments 
of pension funds and do not understand all aspects of risk connected 
with pension savings. Lack of experience and knowledge about risk 
management of pension plans has a signifi cant impact on whether em-
ployers introduce such a plan. Of course, there are also other important 
reasons why there are very few occupational pension plans in Poland 
(for example, complicated registration procedures, not enough tax in-
centives for pension plans’ sponsors, and situation on labor market).   
 The Financial Supervision Commission is obligatorily provided 
by occupational pension plans with information on such risk factors, 
such as the rate of return. Others, such as currency risk, depend on the 
investment strategy of the fund. Yet other factors, such as business risk 
or the risk of the investment preferences of participants, can be judged 
best by business enterprises providing occupational pension plans to 
their employees. 
For this reason, an indirect risk assessment has been chosen in the 
form of a survey of company representatives providing occupational 
pension plans. In February 2011, 1,099 companies were running occu-
pational pension plans. The survey included 100 companies that were 
selected using stratifi ed random sampling. There were three strata of 
pension plans concerning different legal forms (capital fund, capital-
insurance fund, employees fi nancial program). The strata fraction in the 
sample was proportionate to the fraction in the population. The survey 
was done by telephone, with an answer rate of about 90 percent. 
 Responses were measured using the following scales:
• Binomial scale—yes/no in order to assess the most important 
risk factors and recommendations for regulators.
• Ordinal scale to assess the level of risk (rating scale: low, me-
dium, high, and hard to tell).
• Ordinal scale to assess communication, risk reduction tools, 
and system design (rating scale: defi nitely yes, probably yes, 
it’s hard to say, probably not, defi nitely not).
• Nominal scale to assess appropriate strategies for investors 
with different preferences toward risk (rating scale: the level of 
risk and income corresponding to the majority of participants, 
etc.).
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Fig. 8.1  Respondents’ Percentage Indicating Importance of Chosen
Factors of Risk
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.











The most important risk factors are listed in Table 8.1. Figure 8.1 
shows the proportion of respondents that recognized the individual 
risk factors as the most important. This is a multiple-choice question 
in which one can indicate any number of factors as the most important: 
it can be one, several, or all of the risk factors. Only 17 percent of re-
spondents indicated one most important factor, which indicates high 
importance of several factors. Among other respondents, the most nu-
merous group was the one that indicated two most important factors (31 
percent), while 17 percent marked three factors. Four and fi ve factors 
were selected by 13 percent of respondents; more factors were selected 
by the remaining 9 percent of respondents. 
Investment risk was recognized as the most important factor for 
most (63 percent of respondents). It is understood as an uncertainty 
of the rate of return. Sixty-two percent of respondents indicated the 
macroeconomic risk of the situation on the fi nancial markets and the 
economy as a whole, while 41 percent of respondents indicated a mi-
croeconomic risk of an enterprise’s activity.
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A signifi cant proportion of the companies surveyed (as many as 56 
percent) pointed to the importance of legal-political risk. About one-
third of all companies considered infl ation and fi nancial institutions 
settling accounts of occupational pension plans as important risk fac-
tors. Thus, they referred to external risk management. Only 12 percent 
of the surveyed companies confi rmed that foreign exchange risk poses 
a threat to pension plans, and only 2 percent indicated other important 
risk factors and mentioned manipulation and the lack of knowledge.
Because the representatives of companies identifi ed investment 
risk as the greatest source of risk, another question regarded the assess-
ment of its level in the fi nancial market and in pension plans. Figure 8.2 
shows that the risk of fi nancial markets is rated as average for more than 
half of the respondents and high for the remaining 40 percent. Twenty-
four percent of respondents indicated a high level of risk in fi nancial 
markets, noting that it has been higher after the crisis, while 16 percent 
of respondents said that although this risk is high, it has not increased 
as a result of the crisis. However, the perceived level of risk of occu-
Figure 8.2  Assessment of Investment Risk Level of the Occupational 
Plans and Whole Capital Market (% of Positive Answers)
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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pational pension plans is lower than the risk of the fi nancial market. 
Eighty percent of respondents believe that it is of an average level, and 
12 percent believe that it is actually low.
The risk of the investment preferences of pension participants cov-
ers a mismatch between the level of risk aversion of the pension plan 
and its participants due to a single investment pool. In Poland, partici-
pants of occupational pension plans can choose one of the investment 
funds offered by the fi nancial institution that manages their pension 
plan (for example, fund investing in securities or treasury bonds). They 
have the right to move their assets from one fund to another. 
With the exception of one form of pension plan (the occupational 
pension fund, which does not have to be managed by an external fi -
nancial institution), workers do not have any infl uence on investment 
strategy of a given pension fund. Therefore, we asked representatives of 
employers offering pension plans about how they select plan risk pref-
erences (see Figure 8.3). Most respondents chose strategies accepted 
by a company’s management in consultation with representatives (34 
percent) or strategies that were the most popular among participants. 
Both of those choices are irrational because they lack fi nance and in-
vestment education and experience—some people’s preferences even 
appeared to resemble gambling, which was observed during the stock 
market boom (Griffi n, Harris, and Topaloglu 2003). That means that 
plans should take into account the risk of mismatch and irrational pref-
Figure 8.3  Risk-Return Preferences in Occupational Pension Plans
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Recommended by independent 
fi nancial adviser
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erences. The most rational preference strategy is that recommended 
by an independent consultant (chosen by 28 percent of enterprises). 
The least frequently chosen option was the risk-return strategy recom-
mended by the fi nancial institution managing the occupational pension 
plan (18 percent). Once again, results suggest a lack of confi dence by 
employers in fi nancial institutions as agents of the occupational pension 
plan (principal-agent confl ict). Risk preferences should be matched to 
the diverse age structure of participants and its dynamics in time. 
We now evaluate the management of occupational pension plans 
regarding the information provided to participants about the risks and 
protection against them, as well as the principles of the design of occu-
pational pension plans. Figure 8.4 shows consecutive percentage stakes 
regarding the distribution of responses by the representatives of em-
ployers to the following six questions:
1) Do you believe that employees/participants of the program 
and their employers are aware of all the risks associated with 
a given pension plan? Most of the companies and their insured 
employees are informed about the risks, according to the rep-
resentatives of the employers. Only 20 percent believe that 
communication from occupational pension plans or their man-
aging institutions remains insuffi cient.
2) Does the current pension plan structure provide their partici-
pants with adequate protection against the risk of investment 
and other risks associated with the fi nancial market? Most com-
panies indicate very little protection against such risks. 
3) Occupational pension plans in Poland are defi ned contribu-
tion plans. All the risks rest on the participants. Is this the right 
solution? 
4) Defi ned benefi t pension plans predetermine pension amounts in 
proportion to wages. If such occupational pension plans were 
available in Poland, would you be willing to offer them to your 
employees, being aware of the additional fi nancial obligations?
5) In mixed (hybrid) programs, part of the investment risk is as-
sumed by the employer, and the employee also bears some of 
it (i.e., a program with a defi ned contribution but a guaranteed 
minimum benefi t). If such occupational pension plans were 
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available in Poland, would you be willing to offer them to your 
employees, being aware of the additional fi nancial obligations?
6) Do we need to introduce a pension guarantee fund? 
Replies for questions 3–6 are shown in Figure 8.4 and indicate that 
the majority of companies involved in occupational pension plans in 
Poland consider the plans with a defi ned contribution as imperfect, but 
they are not willing to accept plans where the risk is carried onto them. 
They do call for the introduction of a pension guarantee fund, which 
would take over the obligations of an occupational pension plan if the 
company went bankrupt. In another question, respondents indicated 
that the guarantee fund should be fi nanced jointly by employers and the 
state (38 percent), employers and employees (36 percent), employers 
only (13 percent), the Treasury (9 percent), or only by the workers (4 
percent).
For questions about changes in regulation of occupational pension 
plans, the majority of business representatives surveyed did not support 
any changes, including an increase in the Financial Supervision Com-
mission’s control over occupational pension plans, an implementation 























would agree to 
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Yes Rather yes Lack of opinion Rather no No
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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of pension plan design choice, or an increase in the role of employ-
ers and employees in the investment strategy (see Figure 8.5). Almost 
50 percent of business representatives noted the need for regulation by 
obliging an agent managing an occupational pension plan to provide 
information more frequently. 
INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF OCCUPATIONAL
PENSION PLANS IN POLAND
Effi ciency refers to the results-to-effort ratio. Converted into per-
centage it becomes the rate of return. In the case of an investment 
activity, the rate of return itself is not an appropriate indicator of per-
formance because it does not include effort in the form of volatility risk 
valuation of a fi nancial instrument or its stock market price. Valuation 
risk of a fi nancial instrument is related to operational and fi nancial risk 
of an issuer (and, in the case of the stock exchange instruments, of li-
Figure 8.5  Respondents’ Recommendations for System and Regulation 
of Pension Occupational Plans (%)
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
0 10 20 30 40 50
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quidity risk and the situation on the capital market). Therefore, the rate 
of return of a fund is calculated per unit of measure of risk and com-
pared to this ratio value calculated for the Polish fi nancial market. The 
risk of actively managed portfolios is measured in one way (the classic 
measure is the standard deviation of the rate of return), and in another 
for passively managed portfolios, which eliminates the specifi c risk. 
There are also a few methods to conduct a comparison with market 
effectiveness. 
A number of performance measures of capital investment have 
been developed, and we will briefl y describe the three most versatile 
and widely used ones. Each ratio has its own interpretation, as well as 
pros and cons. These ratios assume the calculation of effi ciency un-
der conditions of multiple market valuation of fi nancial instruments or 
other investment assets, which is usually satisfi ed in the case of instru-
ments listed on a stock exchange or other regulated markets.1
1) The Sharpe ratio is the average rate of return attributable to one 
percentage point of the variation of the rate of return, measured 
by standard deviation (see Fabozzi and Modigliani [2009, 
pp. 162, 191]; Ostrowska [2007, p. 252]). An investment that 
obtains the highest value of this ratio is considered the most ef-
fi cient strategy. The construction of this index assumes that the 
portfolio rate of return exceeds the risk-free rate of return. Oth-
erwise, the index loses its ability to assess the effi ciency of the 
portfolio (see Brzęczek [2004, p. 7]; Węgrzyn [2006 p. 11]). 
2) The Treynor ratio determines the rate of return for taking the 
average market risk (see Fabozzi and Modigliani [2009, pp. 
157, 191]; Ostrowska [2007, p. 249]). Portfolio bonus for the 
risk taken (excess portfolio return over the risk-free rate) is di-
vided by its market risk measure/coeffi cient β (see Fabozzi and 
Modigliani [2009, p. 195]). The Treynor ratio calculated for 
the evaluated portfolio is compared to the surplus market rate 
of return. As in the previous case, the higher the ratio, the more 
effi cient the portfolio. This ratio takes into account only the 
market risk of the portfolio, so it is useful for the assessment of 
well-diversifi ed portfolios. Like the Sharpe ratio, it can be used 
if the bonus for portfolio risk remains positive. 
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3) Jensen’s Index, or Jensen’s alpha, refers to the rate of portfo-
lio return relative to the market risk taken, as well as to the 
market return rate (see Fabozzi and Modigliani [2009, p. 203]; 
Ostrowska [2007, p. 249]). The effi ciency of investment is 
evaluated by comparing the index to zero. Positive values  in-
dicate that the fund is performing better than the market, and 
negative values indicate a weaker result than the market aver-
age. Generally, the higher the ratio, the better the portfolio’s 
management. 
The Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen ratios cannot be compared be-
cause the fi rst two convert surplus return per unit of risk of different 
type, and the third compares it to the market rate of return.
Table 8.2 lists two groups of institutions. Occupational pension 
plans in the form of Employees’ Pension Funds are separate funds man-
aged by enterprises; fi nancial institutions are only agents for them. The 
second group, mutual open pension funds, is only fi nanced by enter-
prises, but is fully managed by investment fund corporations, including 
insurance management companies. Therefore, the evaluation of the effi -
ciency of investments was made separately in both groups. An average 
monthly rate of return from employee and mutual pension funds was 
calculated along with its standard deviation for the years 2009–2011. 
The risk-free monthly rate of return was calculated on the basis of the 
interest rates on three-year retail Treasury bonds during the analyzed 
period per month (6.35 percent / 12 = 0.53 percent). On this basis, the 
Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen ratios were determined. The results are 
presented in Table 8.3.
The monthly rate of return for employee pension plans is 0.55 per-
cent and is only slightly higher than the interest rate of Treasury bonds. 
The rate of return from the WIG index (the index of broad market of ba-
sic shares of the Warsaw Stock Exchange in Poland) was much higher, 
and the highest rate of return was achieved by investment fund corpo-
rations. However, the analyzed period begins after the slump of 2008, 
which signifi cantly improves the performance of risky assets funds. 
The second difference is the level of risk for strategies listed in Table 
8.3. Total risk measured with standard deviation from the rate of return 
is far smaller for occupational pension plans than for mutual pension 
funds and WIG index. Similar proportions are maintained between the 
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Table 8.2  Authorities Managing the Occupational Pension Plans 
Grouped by Form of a Plan
Management entity
Number of occupational 
pension plans managed 
Inter-Company Employee Pension Institution PZU SA 1
Employee Pension Institution NESTLE SA POLAND 6
Employee Pension Institution “New World” SA 19
Employee Pension Institution of Polish Telecom 3
Employee Pension Institution UNILEVER POLAND SA 7
Investment Fund Institution BPH 16
BZ WBK AIB SA Investment Fund Corporation 2
Aviva Investors SA Investment Fund Corporations 10
Investors SA Investment Fund Corporation 8
ING SA Investment Fund Corporation 62
KBC SA Investment Fund Corporation 3
Legg Mason SA Investment Fund Corporation 40
Pioneer Pekao SA Investment Fund Corporation 7
PKO SA Investment Fund Corporation 7
TREASURY SA Investment Fund Corporation 3
Allianz Polska SA Investment Fund Corporation 4
PZU SA Investment Fund Corporation 104
Spółdzielcze Kasy Oszczędnościowo-Kredytowe S.A. 
Investment Fund Corporation 24
Union Investment SA Investment Fund Corporations 1
Aviva SA Life Insurance Company 133
Generali Życie SA Insurance Company 36
Nordea Poland SA Life Insurance Company 3
Pierwsze Amerykańsko-Polskie Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń 
na Życie i Reasekuracji Amplico Life S.A. 41
PZU SA Life Insurance Company 472
Sopot Life Insurance Company Ergo Hestia SA 1
Allianz SA Life Insurance Company 99
Warta SA Life Insurance Company 4
Total 1,116
SOURCE: Financial Supervisory Commission reports, accessed November 20, 2012.
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amounts of market risk measured by the beta coeffi cient. Calculating 
the rate of return on its percentage point variation (Sharpe ratio), em-
ployee pension funds turn out to be less effi cient than the Polish capital 
market represented by the WIG index. Mutual pension funds appear to 
be much more effi cient than the market.
In conclusion, employee pension funds are characterized by low 
risk but do not offer a higher rate of return than Treasury bonds. This 
suggests that the continued operation of this form makes sense only in 
the form of bond funds. An alternative is to transfer these funds to mu-
tual funds, which are much better prepared for global investing. 
CONCLUSION
Four general conclusions can be drawn from the replies of employ-
ers offering employee pension plans in Poland:











Average rate of return (%)c 0.55 1.35 1.13
Standard deviation of 
return (%)
2.15 2.95 6.96
Sharpe Ratio 0.01 0.28 0.09
Coeffi cient ß 0.30 0.37 1.00
Treynor ratio (%) 0.07 2.25 0.60
Jensen index (%) −0.16 0.01 0.00
a The monthly rate of return and performance indicators were calculated on the basis of 
valuation of shares of all fi ve employee pension funds (source: Financial Supervision 
Authority and the Warsaw Stock Exchange Bulletins 2012, 2011, 2010).
b The calculations for investment funds are based on their net assets and managed capi-
tal fl ows (source: Statistics of IZFiA–Chamber of Fund and Asset Management). 
c Average rate of return of the analyzed group of entities, in the case of employee pen-
sion funds is not a weighted value of the assets of entities (the results would seek one 
pension fund with by far the largest assets), while in the case of investment funds, the 
weighted value of assets.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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1) Respondents point to investment performance and economic 
conditions as the most important risk factors for occupational 
pension plans. They note, however, other important political 
and business risk factors for the sponsors of employee pension 
funds.
2) The perceived risk of fi nancial markets is high, while the in-
vestment risk of employee pension plans regarding their 
investments remains on an average level. Replies suggest the 
existence of the agent-principal problem (the so-called theory of 
agency costs). Only 20 percent of enterprises with occupational 
pension plans chose an investment strategy recommended by 
fi nancial agents of the program. The respondents note a signifi -
cant risk of error of an agent.
3) The current design of occupational pension plans is not consid-
ered optimal by the majority of respondents. In their opinion, 
the only major change needed is the introduction of a guar-
antee fund. The vast majority of respondents are in favor of a 
guarantee fund for the payment of benefi ts under occupational 
pension plans, as is the case in Germany (the fund protects 
against the risk of insolvency of the employer-sponsor of the 
program). In Germany both defi ned benefi t and defi ned contri-
bution plan types are found, as well as hybrid types, although 
even defi ned contribution plans are legally required to have 
some sort of guarantee to workers, such as return of contribu-
tions. Such a solution could be implemented in Poland, where 
all occupational pension plans are defi ned contribution plans. 
From the other side, the same guarantees, if they were imple-
mented, could be treated as another obligation for employers 
and stop at least some of them from creating pension plans 
in their companies. It is always easier to declare some safety 
measures than fi nance them. And such a guarantee fund most 
likely would be fi nanced by employers and not the state. There 
is also a need to better inform both employers—the sponsors—
and employees (participants of pension plans) on the level of 
risk associated with the investment strategies used by fi nancial 
institutions managing a program (i.e., selected to support the 
investment fund companies, life insurance companies, or em-
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ployee pension funds). This confi rms the previously indicated 
agent-principal problems.
4) Employee pension funds are characterized by low risk but do 
not offer a higher rate of return than Treasury bonds. This sug-
gests that the continued operation of this form makes sense 
only in the form of bond funds. An alternative is to transfer 
these funds to investment funds, which are more prepared for 
global investment and as a sector have been more effective than 
the Polish capital market. This shows that there are benefi ts to 
large-scale investments, which are not available for employee 
pension funds.
These fi ndings may constitute a starting point for discussion on the 
institutional framework to reduce the risk for employee pension plan 
participants, but also for the companies that offer such programs to their 
employees.
Note
1. The selected set of performance indexes was considered suffi cient. For specifi c 
purposes other indexes are used: information, Sortino, M2, etc. (see Węgrzyn 
[2006, pp. 53–62]).
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